GHSA-c2rm-g55x-8hr5 LOW npm/nuxt-og-image

CVE: CVE-2026-44589

Summary

The isBlockedUrl() denylist introduced in nuxt-og-image@6.2.5 to remediate GHSA-pqhr-mp3f-hrpp (Dmitry Prokhorov / Positive Technologies, March 2026) is incomplete. The patch advisory states "Decimal/hexadecimal IP encoding bypasses are also handled" — that part is true (Node's WHATWG URL parser canonicalizes those forms before validation), but the v6.2.5 implementation misses two independent surfaces in the latest release 6.4.8:

1. IPv6 prefix list is incomplete. The IPv6 branch checks only bare === "::1" || startsWith("fc") || startsWith("fd") || startsWith("fe80"). It misses:

- [::ffff:7f00:1] — IPv6-mapped IPv4 loopback in pure-hex form (RE_MAPPED_V4 regex requires dotted-quad). Reaches 127.0.0.1 on a single-stack-IPv4 host with no other primitive needed.

- [fec0::/10] (RFC 3879 site-local — deprecated but still routable on legacy networks)

- [5f00::/16] (RFC 9602 SRv6 SIDs)

- [3fff::/20] (RFC 9637 IPv6 documentation v2)

- [64:ff9b:1::/48] (RFC 8215 NAT64 local-use, including embedded IPv4 loopback [64:ff9b:1::7f00:1])

2. No redirect re-validation. isBlockedUrl runs once on the initial <img src>. The subsequent $fetch(decodedSrc, ...) (ofetch, default redirect-follow) follows 30x responses with no second-pass validation. Any allowed origin that returns a 302 to an internal IP — S3 redirect rules, GCS, Azure, CloudFront, any user-content CDN where the attacker can place a single redirect — completes the SSRF.

The net result is that the v6.2.5 SSRF advisory is bypassable in two distinct ways. The same root family as #29 / #38 (ipx) but in a different code path with different gaps — nuxt-og-image does not delegate to ipx, it ships its own validator, and that validator has fresh issues that survived the prior fix.

Affected

PackageVersionRole

📌 来源: GitHub-Advisory | 🆔 CVE-2026-44589 | 📅 2026-05-07